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Introduction !
There is a simple but powerful argument against the human practice of raising 
and killing animals for food (RKF for short). It goes like this: !
1.RKF is extremely bad for animals. 
2.RKF is only trivially good for human beings. 
So, 
3.RKF should be stopped.  1!
Call this The Case Against Meat. Many consider The Case Against Meat to be 
decisive. But not everyone is convinced by it. Four main objections have been 
proposed: !
1. The first premise is false. RKF is not extremely bad for animals, or at 
least, given the possibility of free-range farming, it needn’t be. In fact, by 
giving animals an existence, RKF may even be in the best interests of 
these animals. !
2. The second premise is false. RKF is far more than merely trivially good 
for human beings. This is because of the pleasures of eating meat and 
what these contribute to various social and cultural aspects of our lives. !
!
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3. Animal welfare is relatively unimportant. Even if both premises of the 
argument are true, animal welfare is nowhere near as valuable as human 
welfare. It simply doesn’t matter as much how they fare. !
4. As individuals, we are powerless to change anything. Even if it would be 
best if RKF were to stop, none of us has any reason to abstain from 
eating meat. This is because our individual purchasing decisions have 
only a negligible effect on the demand for meat, and so none at all on 
RKF. !
In this essay, I will attempt to shore up The Case Against Meat by providing 
new responses to each of these objections. !
1. The First Premise !
Many have claimed that RKF is good for animals by giving these animals an 
existence. Leslie Stephen, for example, writes: !
The pig has a stronger interest than anyone in the demand for bacon. If 
all the world were Jewish, there would be no pigs at all.  2!
But it is implausible that having an existence can be better for a being than 
having no existence at all. To be better off in one scenario than in another one 
must have a level of well-being in both scenarios. But those who do not exist in 
a given scenario are not poorly off in that scenario. Rather, they have no level of 
well-being in that scenario. 
It may be objected that non-existent beings can be well or poorly off. 
Cinderella, for example, does not exist, but she was very poorly off until she 
met her Fairy Godmother. 
But when we talk about Cinderella, we are not saying ‘there is some 
woman who had evil step-sisters, rode to a ball in a pumpkin, fell in love with a 
prince, had a level of welfare’, and so on. We are saying precisely that there is no 
such woman. When we say that Cinderella was poorly off until she met her 
Fairy Godmother, we are saying that if there had been such a woman—a woman 
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fitting these descriptions—then this woman would have been poorly off until 
she met her Fairy Godmother.  3
Suppose all of this is granted. A defender of RKF may reply: If one’s 
having an existence cannot be good for one, then one’s having an existence 
cannot be bad for one either. If this is so, however, then RKF, while it may not 
be good for any of the animals that it raises and kills for food, cannot be bad for 
any of these animals. 
However, it is crucial to distinguish between two parts of RKF: !
1. RKF’s bringing animals into existence, and  
2. RKF’s treating these animals in a particular way.  !
It is not (1), but (2), that is bad for animals. RKF is not bad for animals by 
bringing these animals into existence. RKF is bad for animals by giving worse 
lives to these animals who it has brought into existence than these same animals 
might have had. 
To this, a defender of RKF may object that I am assuming that RKF 
involves factory farming—i.e., farming in which animals are raised in cramped 
spaces, caused to feel much pain during their lives, and killed in a brutal 
manner. While it is true that factory farming gives worse lives to animals than 
these same animals might have had, RKF need not involve factory farming. 
RKF might instead involve only free-range farming, which, let us say, gives to 
the animals in question happy lives—including, for example, plenty of green 
space to roam around in, good quality food, contact with each other, and so on
—and then kills them painlessly in their sleep without their anticipation. 
However, I am not assuming that RKF involves factory farming. Even if 
RKF were to involve only free-range farming, the lives it would give to the 
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animals in question would still be much shorter than the lives they might 
otherwise have. These animals would be much better off living longer lives in 
their free-range farms. 
A defender of RKF may deny that animals such as cows, pigs, chickens, 
etc., have anything to gain from living longer. More life, it may be said, is good 
for a being only if this being desires to live longer, or at least has some long-term 
plans, projects, or goals that would be completed or fulfilled if it were to live on. 
Cows, pigs, chickens, etc., have no such desires, plans, projects, or goals, and so 
nothing to gain from additional life. 
Some animal advocates have responded by claiming that cows, pigs, 
chickens, etc., do have such desires, plans, projects, or goals. As evidence of this, 
they have pointed to such things as the concern such animals seem to have for 
the survival and flourishing of their own offspring. 
But this seems to me the wrong response, for two reasons. First, even on 
the most plausible desire-based theories of well-being, it is not the satisfaction 
or frustration of one’s actual desires that is good or bad for one, but only those 
desires that one would have if one were suitably idealised—e.g., a fully informed, 
vividly imagining, maximally mature version of oneself.  Cows, pigs, chickens, 4
etc., might not, as they are, have any desires to live longer or for future things, 
but they might well have such desires if they were suitably idealised. It is 
common for families to speculate on what their family dog or cat might be like 
if he or she were to become much more intelligent and able to converse with 
them. Animals like dogs and cats seem to many of us to have individual 
personalities that might not only survive, but perhaps be made fully manifest 
by, their transformation into beings with greater cognitive faculties. If this were 
so, then we might expect such transformed beings to have preferences 
concerning how the lives of their actual, non-idealised selves are to go. Among 
other things, we might expect them to prefer longer rather than shorter lives for 
their actual selves (providing, of course, that these lives were to be lived on free-
range farms). 
Second, it does not seem necessary for additional life to be good for one 
that one have desires (actual or idealized) that would be satisfied by it. On the 
contrary, it seems enough that the additional life would involve certain kinds of 
pleasures for one. Why would more life be good for a normal human adult like 
myself? One reason is that there are certain kinds of pleasures on the horizon 
for me. Why would more life be good for a young or middle-aged cow, pig, or 
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chicken living on a free-range farm? One reason, similarly, seems to be that, in 
such a setting, there are certain kinds of pleasures on the horizon for it. 
I say certain kinds of pleasures, rather than simply additional pleasures, for 
an important reason. On the view I hold, purely repeated pleasures—i.e., 
pleasures that introduce nothing qualitatively new in terms of pleasurableness 
into a being’s life—add nothing to that being’s lifetime well-being.  Any further 5
pleasures involved in a longer life are good for one only if these pleasures bring 
something qualitatively new in terms of pleasurableness to one’s life. If all a person 
gets in having more life is just the same pleasures of watching their favorite 
sitcom over and over again, then this person has gained nothing by living 
longer. Similarly, I believe, if all an animal gets in having more life is just the 
same pleasures of chewing grass over and over again, then it has gained nothing 
by living longer. The thing is, though, I believe there is considerable scope for 
further qualitatively new pleasures in the life of a free-range animal who is still 
young or middle-aged. My suspicion, indeed, is that many of those who believe 
that additional life cannot be good for an animal believe this only because they 
are falsely presupposing that the only future pleasures available to cows, pigs, 
chickens, etc.—or at least cows, pigs, chickens, etc., that have spent some time 
in a free-range farm—are purely repeated ones. 
What pleasures do I have in mind? Consider a family dog, Gertie. 
Imagine Gertie running around today in the local park, chasing sticks, meeting 
new dogs, having new olfactory pleasures, and exploring parts of the park she 
has never been to before. It seems clear to me, and I hope to you, that it was a 
good thing for Gertie that she lived on til today. If she had died peacefully in 
her sleep last night, this would have been bad for her, since she would not have 
lived on to experience all these wonderful qualitatively new doggy pleasures. 
Similarly, cows roaming free in a green paddock with plenty to eat, even if they 
have no future-oriented desires, may have evolving social lives with each other 
that are a source of qualitatively new pleasures for them as time goes on, or slow 
dawning realizations about their lives or vague increments in understanding 
that are pleasurable in various ways, or different or deeper appreciations of the 
field in which they are grazing as it undergoes changes during the shifting 
seasons, or experiences of watching their offspring grow into adulthood and 
reproduce themselves that involve pride or satisfaction. To kill them when they 
are young or middle-aged would be to rob them of these qualitatively new 
pleasures. 
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I conclude that animals on free-range farms would be better off living 
into old-age than being painlessly killed in their sleep during youth or middle-
age. 
One final objection: What about RKF involving only free-range farming 
that allows the animals in question to live into their old age or til they die of 
natural causes? 
I accept that RKF of this kind would not be bad for the animals in 
question. But would there be much of a market for such meat? This is unclear 
given that many consumers of meat seem to be of the opinion that the flesh of 
older animals is tough and tasteless. In any case, as I will be arguing in Section 
2, even RKF of this kind may be bad for us. 
Of course, the crucial question is whether the amount that animals 
would gain by living into old-age on free-range farms (rather than being killed 
in youth or middle-age) is greater than the amount that humans would gain by 
these animals being killed in their youth or middle-age (rather than when they 
are old). To answer this question, we need to know in what ways meat 
consumption affects human well-being. It is to this matter I now turn. !
2. The Second Premise !
Many people believe that human beings need to eat meat in order to be healthy. 
But even the American Dietetic Association acknowledges that !
vegetarian diets, including total vegetarian or vegan diets, are healthful, 
nutritionally adequate, and may provide health benefits in the prevention 
and treatment of certain diseases.  6!
Still, many meat-eaters remain unconvinced. They say they feel lacking in 
energy, and in health more generally, when they don’t eat meat, and they take 
these feelings to be more reliable indicators of their levels of health than the 
findings of current science. 
!
!6
 This is from the abstract of “Position of the American Dietetic Association: Vegetarian 6
Diets,” Journal of the American Dietetic Association, volume 109, issue 7 (July 2009), pp. 
1266-1282, http://www.eatright.org/cps/rde/xchg/ada/hs.xsl/
advocacy_933_ENU_HTML.htm.
But such feelings do not necessarily indicate ill-health. They may simply 
be withdrawal symptoms from giving up a substance to which one has become 
addicted. Indeed, these feelings seem similar to those many of us have when we 
give up, say, coffee, and nobody thinks that the fact that one feels this way in 
the coffee case shows that giving up coffee is bad for one’s health. (On the 
contrary, it is a feeling one must go through in order to regain health). 
Moreover, the meat industry has paid big money to advertisers to try to get us 
all to think of meat as necessary for health and vitality. We must factor this in 
when assessing our own feelings about whether meat is really necessary for our 
health. 
It may be objected: But when I stop eating meat, I feel lethargic. This 
may not be evidence that my health is independently damaged, but this 
lethargy itself constitutes a decline in health. Health includes things such as 
how energetic or vital one feels. 
However, even if this is true, withdrawal symptoms like these do not last 
very long. Persist with a vegetarian diet and one will likely soon feel energetic 
again—even more energetic than previously, depending on how much meat was 
in one’s diet. One’s cravings for meat, too, will disappear, or at least diminish 
substantially. All this would happen more rapidly still if meat were not readily 
available or if most others were also abstaining. Moreover, if our society were to 
give up meat, then future generations would not get addicted to meat in the 
first place and so suffer none of the withdrawal symptoms of having to give it 
up. 
Suppose all of this is granted. Still, it may be objected: Meat 
consumption makes a very large contribution to our well-being because of the 
pleasures it gives us.  
Many people seem to think that if we were limited only to vegetarian 
meals, eating would soon become a tiresome exercise, and life would lose much 
of its appeal. 
However, as many vegetarians have pointed out, those who make this 
objection cannot have sampled very much vegetarian cuisine. While it is 
certainly true that the vegetarian options at most restaurants and fast-food 
joints today are pretty bland or unappetizing, they are hardly representative of 
what can be done in the kitchen without meat. Vegetarian meals can be not 
only healthful, they can be delicious and satisfying, and admit of such great 
variety that one need never get sick of them. Moreover, if we all stopped eating 
meat, the vegetarian options at restaurants would quickly get tastier and more 
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varied, and in any case it is easy to learn how to make delicious vegetarian meals 
at home. 
A more sophisticated argument has recently been offered by Loren 
Lomasky. Lomasky claims that the pleasures of meat !
afford human beings goods comparable qualitatively and quantitatively to 
those held forth by the arts. Lives of many people would be significantly 
impaired were they to forgo carnivorous consumption.  7!
Lomasky argues for this claim by appeal to the widespread and powerful human 
desire for meat (or its subjective importance to us). He observes that “All across 
the globe…as incomes increase so does the amount of meat in people’s diets”.  8
He goes on: !
When we look at the world’s great cuisines we discover that almost 
without exception they not only include meat but also feature it as a focal 
point of fine meals. In France as in India, China as in Italy, meat is 
sovereign…That so many religions advance constraints on which animals 
are to be eaten and how the permissible ones are to be slaughtered and 
prepared conveys a recognition of meat eating as being among the very 
important components of how human beings can live well.  9!
There are two problems, however, with this argument. First, it relies on a desire-
based or subjective theory of well-being, and, as I suggested above, the most 
plausible versions of such theories hold that it is not one’s actual desires, but 
only one’s idealized desires, that determine what is good or bad for us. This is 
because, as David Sobel nicely puts it, idealized desires “are more fully for their 
object as it really is rather than for the object as it is falsely believed to be”.  10
This is a problem because, while it may be true that most people have a very 
strong desire to eat or enjoy meat, it is not clear that they would continue to 
have this desire if they were suitably idealised. In fact, it seems likely that, 
apprised in a vivid way of all the gory details of the manner in which most 
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animals who end up on our plates are raised and killed, most of us would not 
want to eat meat—let alone enjoy it—ever again.  
Second, as I also suggested above, desire-based theories of well-being are 
implausible. There is not space here to fully make the case against such theories, 
but recall my claim above that such theories cannot explain the value for us of 
future pleasures. It seems good for Gertie the dog that she lived on until today 
to experience an array of qualitatively new doggy pleasures, even if this involved 
no desire of hers being satisfied. If desire-based theories are false, then even if 
our desires to eat or enjoy meat were to survive idealization, this would not 
show our eating or enjoying it to be significantly good for us. 
There is, however, a different, and better, way to argue for Lomasky’s 
claim. This is to say that the pleasures of meat are extremely good for us, not 
because we want (or would want) them, but just because of the particular 
phenomenology of these pleasures themselves (i.e., ‘what it is like’ for one to 
experience them). No vegetarian diet (at least given present technologies) is able 
to provide this particular pleasurable phenomenology. Any life without such 
phenomenology is to that extent impoverished.  
Moreover, it may be added, if we all stopped eating meat, then our 
cultures would be greatly diminished, and along with these the richness of our 
social and cultural encounters. One way we stay connected to our ancestors is 
through the meals they pass down to us. If we all stopped eating meat, then this 
important link with the past would be severed. 
What should we make of this argument? I think we have no choice but 
to accept that the pleasures of meat, and what these contribute to various social 
and cultural aspects of our lives, make us well off in ways that no quantity or 
quality of vegetarian food could possibly achieve (again, given present 
technologies). The absence of these pleasures from a person’s life (even in the 
life of someone who has no desire to eat or enjoy meat) represents a real loss for 
that person. Moreover, this is not a trivial loss. These pleasures are significantly 
good for one. 
However, the important question is: Is this significant loss a significant 
net loss? In what follows, I will sketch three reasons for thinking that it is not. 
First, what we would lose by giving up the cultural traditions associated 
with our meat consumption may be fully compensated for by pleasures gained 
from reinventing these dishes in vegetarian ways and forging new traditions at 
the dinner table. It is not as if by removing meat from our diet all our 
important connections with the past would be severed. There would still be a 
great deal of cultural continuity that would be possible. And we should not 
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underestimate what may be gained by starting afresh and exercising our 
creativity. 
Second, meat is very costly to produce. If we were to cut meat from our 
diets, the resources that are currently spent on its production could be 
redirected toward other areas of our lives such as health, education, 
infrastructure, and so on. 
Third, there are reasons to believe that there could be some heavy 
psychological costs associated with meat consumption. Consider, first, that 
most of us grow up as children who love animals. When we first discover that 
the meat on our plate is the body of an animal who has been killed for our 
consumption, this distresses us greatly. When we learn further of what goes on 
in farms and slaughterhouses, even free-range ones, many of us are truly 
horrified. We are, however, very good at putting these thoughts out of our 
heads and carrying on with our meat-eating—especially given the often 
considerable social and economic pressure to do so. But an idea ignored can 
continue to affect one. There is a growing body of evidence that most of us 
experience many kinds of significant pleasurable and unpleasurable feelings 
without being aware of them—i.e., in the background of our consciousness.  An 11
especially vivid example (on the pleasure side) is provided by a patient of Oliver 
Sacks, who writes: !
Sense of smell? I never gave it a thought. You don’t normally give it a 
thought. But when I lost it—it was like being struck blind. Life lost a 
good deal of its savor—one doesn’t realize how much ‘savor’ is smell. You 
smell people, you smell books, you smell the city, you smell the spring—
maybe not consciously, but as a rich unconscious background to 
everything else. My whole world was suddenly radically poorer.  12!
On the side of unpleasurable experiences, Daniel Haybron writes: 
Some affective states are more elusive than the paradigmatic ones, 
particularly moods and mood-like states such as anxiety, tension, ennui, 
malaise...They may exceed our powers of discernment even while they are 
occurring...A vague sense of malaise might easily go unnoticed, yet it can 
sour one’s experience far more than the sharper and more pronounced 
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ache that persists after having stubbed one’s toe. Likewise for depression, 
anxiety and related mood states, at least in their milder forms. Consider 
how a tense person will often learn of it only when receiving a massage, 
whereas stressed or anxious individuals may discover their emotional 
state only by attending to the physical symptoms of their distress. 
Presumably being tense, anxious, or stressed detracts substantially from 
the quality of one’s experience, even when one is unaware of these 
states.  13
How can this happen? Haybron explains it as follows: 
Everyone knows that we often adapt to things over time: what was once 
pleasing now leaves no impression or seems tiresome, and what used to 
be highly irritating is now just another feature of the landscape. Could it 
also be that some things are lastingly pleasant or unpleasant, while our 
awareness of them fades? I would suggest that it can. Perhaps you have 
lived with a refrigerator that often whined due to a bad bearing. If so, 
you might have found that, with time, you entirely ceased to notice the 
racket. But occasionally, when the compressor stopped, you did notice 
the sudden, glorious silence. You might also have noted, first, a painful 
headache, and second, that you’d had no idea how obnoxious the noise 
was—or that it was occurring at all—until it ceased. But obnoxious it 
was, and all the while it had been, unbeknownst to you, fouling your 
experience as you went about your business. In short, you’d been having 
an unpleasant experience without knowing it. Moreover, you might well 
have remained unaware of the noise even when reflecting on whether you 
were enjoying yourself: the problem here is ignorance—call it reflective 
blindness—and not, as some have suggested, the familiar sort of 
inattentiveness we find when only peripherally aware of something. In 
such cases we can bring our attention to the experience easily and at will. 
Here the failure of attention is much deeper: we are so lacking in 
awareness that we can’t attend to the experience, at least not without 
prompting (as occurs when the noise suddenly changes).  14
Similarly, I want to suggest, it may be the case that, knowing what meat is—
and, in particular, what we do to animals in farming and slaughtering them for 
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food—sours or pollutes our experiences of eating meat, and perhaps our 
experiences of living in this world more generally, in ways that are very hard or 
even impossible to attend to while we are still meat-eaters. Certainly, many 
people claim to find the experience of giving up meat similar in various respects 
to the experience Haybron describes of being at home in one’s kitchen when the 
compressor of the whining refrigerator switches off. Many say they experienced 
a tremendous sense of relief or freedom, or a lightness of being, after giving up 
meat—feelings they had not anticipated, and that suggest they were 
experiencing unconscious pain beforehand. 
Part of the unconscious pain felt by meat-eaters, I suspect, has to do with 
their having deliberately turned away when they were children from something 
that they sensed at the time was an important moral issue. This turning away 
seems likely to leave one with a burden comparable to that carried by a person 
who has reason to suspect a friend of theirs of having committed some heinous 
crime, but who refuses to investigate further or turn her friend in for some 
relatively trivial reason (say, fear of upsetting the balance of her social life). 
People who ignore qualms they have or silence parts of themselves cannot be 
fully happy individuals. Moreover, their being like this may prevent them from 
being the sort of open people who are able to take joy in many other aspects of 
life. So, ignoring the issue of meat, refusing to investigate, may close one off to 
various other possible pleasures. 
It may be objected: But what about free-range farming? If (as I conceded 
in Section 1) animals who are raised in free-range farms, and get to live on into 
old-age, are not harmed by RKF, then why should we have any qualms at all 
about participating in this system that raises and kills them for food? Why 
should our participation in such a system have any tendency to make us feel 
bad? 
I accept, of course, that there would be nothing bad about such a system 
deriving from harms inflicted on these animals. In such a system, these animals 
are not harmed, and so there can be nothing of disvalue deriving from their 
being harmed. Since this is the case, there may be a sense in which we should 
not be disturbed or upset by such a system, or by our participation in it. But 
even such a system, I want now to suggest, would nonetheless cause most of us 
psychological suffering (even if we believed it should not). 
Let me explain. For most of us, the thought of the dead bodies of our 
friends and loved ones, or even those of complete strangers, being cut up or 
torn to pieces is deeply distressing. It is even worse to think of their body parts 
then being devoured by some creature. That it causes such distress to us seems 
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to be, not because we think it harms these people (for they are already dead and 
so cannot be harmed by anything anymore), but because it reminds us of the 
fact that we are embodied (and so finite) beings, and with that much of the 
suffering and tragedy of our lives. We prefer to bury intact the bodies of our 
loved ones, or burn them, so that it is not possible for them to be taken apart. 
I suspect that, for many of us, there is a similar pain—albeit often an 
unconscious one—that accompanies our thoughts of what takes place in 
slaughterhouses, even slaughterhouses where the animals in question have been 
killed painlessly without their anticipation. These practices are unavoidably 
grisly. The thought of the bodies of these animals being taken apart, ending up 
on our plates, and being devoured by us, is a painful reminder of what we all 
are: embodied beings prone to disease, suffering, and death.  15
To emphasize: I do not pretend to have proven here that we suffer any of 
the unconscious pains I have been describing. What I have said remains largely 
speculative. But I do hope to have persuaded you that there is some possibility, 
and perhaps also some reason to believe, that such pains exist—that is enough 
for my purposes. Whether such pains actually exist I will leave to the scientists 
of the future, with their superior technologies, to confirm or disconfirm. 
I conclude that, while the absence of the pleasures of meat in a person’s 
life truly does represent a significant loss for that person, when we take into 
account (i) the pleasures involved in forging new culinary traditions, (ii) the 
economic opportunity costs of meat production, and (iii) the possible 
psychological costs associated with meat-eating, we see that it is probably not a 
significant net loss, and may not even be a net loss at all. !
3. The Unimportance of Animal Well-Being !
According to some, even if RKF is extremely bad for animals and only trivially 
good for us, RKF should continue. This is because animal well-being is far less 
important than human well-being. Great harm to animals is less bad than the 
relatively small sacrifice involved for us in giving up meat. 
But this is an implausible idea. There seems no good reason why the 
well-being of some creatures should be worth more than the well-being of 
others. It seems far more plausible to think that the intrinsic value simpliciter of 
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some increase in a being’s lifetime well-being is proportional just to the amount 
of the increase. 
Why, then, do some people think that human well-being is worth more 
than animal well-being? As others have pointed out, it seems likely to have to 
do with the fact that humans seem capable of having much higher levels of 
lifetime well-being than any other animals on this planet. Those who think 
human well-being is more valuable may be confusing the fact that we can be 
more greatly benefited with our benefits having greater value. 
For this diagnosis to be right, however, we need an account of why 
human beings are capable of much higher levels of lifetime well-being than 
animals. No-one has yet provided a satisfactory such account. In the remainder 
of this section, I want briefly to suggest one. 
The reason human beings are capable of much higher levels of lifetime 
well-being, I believe, has to do with a point I made in Section 1, namely that 
purely repeated pleasures add nothing to a being’s level of lifetime well-being. 
Human beings have available to them much greater diversity in pleasurable 
experiences than other animals do. While I claimed above that Gertie the family 
dog may experience many qualitatively new pleasures on a given day in 
exploring the park, meeting other new dogs, smelling new smells, etc., I think 
these pleasures are quite limited when compared with the pleasures we humans 
are able to obtain from our much deeper relationships with each other, much 
greater capacity to understand ourselves and learn about the world, more 
sophisticated experiences of art and beauty, ability to appreciate the importance 
of things, set goals, and work toward their completion, and capacity for selfless 
or virtuous behavior. 
It is an easy mistake to confuse this greater capacity for well-being with 
our well-being’s having greater value. But it is a mistake. The death of a normal 
cow in a paddock is less bad than the premature death of a normal human 
being, but this is not because human well-being matters more than animal well-
being. It is because there is much more that continued life can add to the 
lifetime well-being of a normal human being than to the life of a cow. When we 
do genuinely harm animals a lot—as RKF does—this is extremely bad. !
4. Causal Impotence !
Suppose everything I have said so far is correct, and it would be best if RKF 
were to stop. Nonetheless, it may be claimed, none of us has a reason to abstain 
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from eating meat. This is because our individual purchasing decisions have only 
a negligible effect on the demand for meat, and so on the lives of the animals 
raised and killed by RKF. 
Strictly speaking, this objection does not threaten the conclusion of The 
Case Against Meat. After all, this conclusion says nothing about our individual 
reasons to act. It says only that RKF should be stopped (or, as I have been 
taking this to mean, that it would be best if RKF were to come to an end). 
Nonetheless, I believe that even if we cannot, by abstaining from meat, 
improve the lives of any animals, we may each have sufficient reason to abstain 
from it. This is because, as I suggested in Section 2, it is possible that there are 
heavy psychological costs associated with meat-eating. While the absence of the 
pleasures of meat in a person’s life represents a significant loss for that person, it 
is a loss that may be fully compensated for by freedom from these psychological 
costs. If this is right, then many of us may have most self-interested reason to 
stop eating meat. 
Furthermore, even if most of us lack the power to cause many other 
people to give up meat (and so reduce demand for meat enough to save or 
improve any animal lives), most of us are able, through making changes to our 
own diet and publicly opposing RKF, to cause some of our friends to abstain 
from meat as well, which would be very good for them. !
Conclusion !
In this paper, I have tried to shore up The Case Against Meat by offering new 
responses to the four main objections to this argument. In Section 1, I argued 
that RKF is bad for animals, not by bringing them into existence, but by giving 
worse lives to the animals that it has brought into existence than these same 
animals might have had. I argued that even free-range farming is bad for 
animals by giving them shorter lives than they would have had if they had lived 
on into old-age. 
In Section 2, I argued that while the absence of the pleasures of meat in a 
person’s life represents a significant loss for that person, it is a not a significant 
net loss, and may not even be a net loss at all in light of the opportunity costs of 
meat-eating and the possibly heavy psychological costs associated with meat-
eating. 
In Section 3, I tried to explain why human beings are capable of higher 
levels of lifetime well-being than other animals on this planet, and so why some 
!
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people might mistakenly believe that human well-being is more valuable than 
animal well-being. 
Finally, in Section 4, I pointed out that it is no objection to The Case 
Against Meat if, as individuals, we cannot save or improve any animals lives by 
becoming vegetarian. I then suggested that, even if we cannot save or improve 
any animals lives by becoming vegetarian, we may have sufficient self-interested 
reason to stop eating meat due to the psychological costs of meat-eating I 
described in Section 2. 
We should stop raising and killing animals for food. Our practice of 
doing so is very harmful for these animals, and not very good—and perhaps 
even, on balance, bad—for us. !
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